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Article
The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental
Savior or Regulatory Carte Blanche?
David P. Vincent†
I.

INTRODUCTION

As nations attempt to rebound from the global recession of
the late 2000s, political leaders continue to scramble to improve
1
their domestic and supranational economies. Governments
have confronted “the difficult task of spurring current growth
and employment without saddling their economies with so
much debt that they sacrifice long-term growth and financial
2
stability.”
The Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), along with economists and policy
3
analysts, believe that free trade agreements (FTAs) offer a
sensible means to spur economic growth, trade, and
4
investment, thereby adding jobs and increasing prosperity
5
throughout affected areas. FTAs eliminate barriers to trade
†

J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of
California, San Diego, 2009. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial
staff of the Minnesota Journal of International Law, particularly Articles
Editor Russell Squire for his dedication and commitment demonstrated
throughout the editing process.
1. Josh Bivens, Andrew Fieldhouse, & Heidi Shierholtz, From Free Fall
to
Stagnation,
ECON.
POLICY
INST.
(Feb.14,
2013),
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp355-five-years-after-start-of-great-recession/.
2. The
World
Factbook,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2013).
3. WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE
POLICY 1-2 (2012) (defining an FTA as an agreement between two or more
countries that reduces or eliminates government interference in trade).
4. Id. at 9-10; Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
EXEC.
OFFICE
OF
THE
PRESIDENT,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
5. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356 at 1–2.
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6

between countries. Contrary to their name, however, they may
7
pose costly side effects when implemented improperly.
FTAs can greatly increase a country’s exports by reducing
or eliminating import quotas, export subsidies, and protective
8
9
tariffs. The United States actively promotes FTAs as an
10
excellent way to open up foreign markets to exporters. In
11
2010, 41% of all U.S. exports went to FTA partner countries,
with exports to such countries growing at a faster rate than

6. Id. at 9-10.
7. See Americans Are of Two Minds on Trade, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov.
10,
2010),
http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/11/09/americans-are-of-twominds-on-trade/; Joseph Stiglitz, So-called Free Trade Talks Should Be in the
Public, Not Corporate Interest, GUARDIAN ECON. BLOG (July 5, 2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2013/jul/05/free-tradetalks-public-corporate-interest.
8. See Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV.[OECD], CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: AN OECD
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL SURVEY 761-65 (2003) (demonstrating the
augmentation of exports and economic welfare in wake of the reduction of
quotas and tariffs in China between 1996 and 2000); Gene M. Grossman &
Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade
Agreement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3914, 1991),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3914.pdf?new_window=1
(“A
reduction in trade barriers generally will affect the environment by expanding
the scale of economic activity, by altering the composition of economic activity,
and by bringing about a change in the techniques of production.”).
9. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356 at 1–2 (noting that FTAs have
played an integral role in U.S. foreign policy since 1994).
10. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 8; See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin,
Op-Ed, World Watches Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Talks, JAPAN TIMES, July
28, 2013, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/28/commentary
/world-watches-trans-atlantic-free-trade-talks/#.UgEqbmR4Yap ("[The TransAtlantic Trade and Investment Partnership] would eliminate all trade tariffs
and reduce nontariff barriers, including in agriculture; expand market access
in services trade; bring about closer regulatory harmonization; strengthen
intellectual-property protection; restrict subsidies to state-owned enterprises;
and more.”); Marjorie Olster, U.S. Hopes Free Trade Negotiations Will Drive
Changes in Europe's Economy to Promote Growth, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July
30, 2013, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-hopes-trade-talks-willspur-changes-europe (“The U.S. hopes negotiations for a free trade deal with
the European Union will drive growth-oriented reforms in the EU economy,
the top American trade official said Tuesday. In a similar vein, U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Froman said China's recent agreement to negotiate a
bilateral investment treaty with the United States is a chance to press for
economic reforms in the Asian giant that could level the playing field for
American businesses.”).
11. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 8 (noting that FTAs continue to
become increasingly important to the American economy).
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12

those to the rest of the world. The United States currently
13
maintains FTAs with twenty countries, and in the wake of
Senate confirmation of Michael Froman as Trade
Representative, the USTR appears ready to actively negotiate
14
additional agreements. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
one such agreement currently under negotiation, stands to
15
become the largest free trade agreement in the world.
The negotiating history of the TPP dates back to 2005
when New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei signed an
FTA known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
16
Partnership Agreement (TPSEP). The TPSEP’s founding
members agreed to an accession clause that promoted accession
17
by other countries. Negotiations for the current, expanded
version of this agreement, now known as the Trans-Pacific
18
Partnership or TPP, began in 2009, with new negotiating
19
partners added in the years since. Today there are eleven
negotiating partners: the original four members, the United
States, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and
20
21
Vietnam. The TPP is designed to expand. As talks progress,
the potential for additional members continues. Currently the
12. Id.
13. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 4.
14. Id.; Jim Abrams, Michael Froman Confirmed as U.S. Trade
Representative,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
June
19,
2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/michael-fromanconfirmed_n_3469031.html.
15. What
is
the
Trans-Pacific
Partnership?,
CBC
NEWS,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/what-is-the-trans-pacific-partnership-1.1147888
(last updated June 21, 2012, 9:49 AM).
16. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations, N.Z. MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-EconomicRelations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2013).
17. Ariella Park, Explainer: What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?,
AMERICAS SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.ascoa.org/articles/explainer-what-trans-pacific-partnership.
18. Trans-Pacific
Partnership,
OFFICE
OF
THE
U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-outreach-andupdates (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP].
19. IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).
20. Id.
21. There have been 18 rounds of negotiations, the last taking place in
July 2013 in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 18.
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22

admission of Japan is facing intense debate. With the
admission of more member countries, the potential for the TPP
to widen its geographic and economic influence on the zone of
23
free trade will grow.
Enacting the expanded version of the TPP would likely
24
have significant global economic effects. The existing TPP
countries have a combined GDP of close to $20 trillion and a
25
combined population of over 650 million. Experts speculate
that “if enacted, the TPP would eliminate 11,000 tariff lines
among the parties” and “could serve as a template for future
26
trade pacts among countries in the [Asian-Pacific region],” an
area that “accounts for nearly 60% of global GDP and roughly
27
50% of international trade.” The Asian-Pacific market is one
of the fasting growing in the world; goods traded in the market
have “increased 300% since 1990 with a 400% increase in
28
global investment in the region.” Involving Pacific countries in
the TPP would open additional markets to the United States
and help to alleviate the United States’ staggering $558 billion
29
trade deficit in goods and services remaining from 2011.
22. A TPP Stimulus For Japan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904438194045776329537340086
64.html .
23. Deborah Elms, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, Getting the TransPacific Partnership Over the Finish Line, NBR ANALYSIS BRIEF, Oct. 22, 2012,
available
at
http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/brief/102212_Elms_TPP.pdf.
24. See The Significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for the United
States: Hearing on U.S. Trade Strategy: What's Next for Small Business
Exports? Before the H. Small Bus. Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of
Joshua Meltzer, Fellow of Global Economy and Development at the Brookings
Institute), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/
05/16-us-trade-strategy-meltzer; Meredith Kolsky-Lewis, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 27, 28-29, 51-52 (2011).
25. Christopher Sands, How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Change
Canada, HUFFINGTON POST (CANADA) June 19, 2012, available at
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9003;
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T
OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2012).
26. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Robert E. Scott, U.S. Trade Deficit Up in 2011, China Accounted for
Three-fourths of Rise in Non-oil Goods Trade Deficit, ECON. POLICY INST. (Feb.
10, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/trade-deficit-2011-china-accountedfourths/.
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30

FTAs have the ability to affect more than just trade. In
addition to increased trade flows, FTAs promote innovation,
31
competition, growth, and economic freedom. A uniform FTA
“foster[s] a wellspring of freedom, opportunity, and prosperity”
32
that benefits member nations as well as citizens at-large.
Despite the significant economic impacts of FTAs, they can also
33
negatively influence areas such as the environment. Since the
dawn of industrialization, as trade, investment, and
globalization have boomed, so too have concerns over their
34
environmental impact. Environmental indicators show that
climate change, conservation, energy, pollution, and resource
35
depletion are all directly related to trade. Climate change,
biodiversity, and glacier melt worsen as global trade
36
increases, ultimately leading to resource depletion, plant and
37
animal extinction, flooding, drought, and starvation.
According to a DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum report, if
current trends persist, more than 100 million deaths may be
attributable to climate change and a carbon-intensive economy
38
by 2030. The economic effects of climate change loom large,
30. See Responsible Trade Program: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
SIERRA
CLUB,
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/trans-pacific-partnershipagreement.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
31. Scott L. Baiera & Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, Do Free Trade Agreements
Actually Increase Members' International Trade?, J. OF INT’L ECON., Oct. 2004,
at
1,
available
at
http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/Working_Papers/BaierBergstrandFTA2Oct2004.
pdf (“Stated succinctly, this estimate suggests that an FTA will on average
increase two member countries’ trade about 86 percent after 15 years.”);
Joanne Gowa & Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 408, 416 (1993) (“[Free trade alliances] exert a direct,
statistically significant, and large effect on bilateral trade flows.”).
32. Denise H. Froning, The Benefits of Free Trade: A Guide for
Policymakers,
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/08/the-benefits-of-free-trade-aguide-for-policymakers (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
33. See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 30.
34. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME [UNEP], Key Economic Indicators, UNEP
Y.B. 2012: EMERGING ISSUES IN OUR GLOBAL Env’t 51–65 (2012), available at
http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2012/pdfs/UYB_2012_CH_4.pdf.
35. SIERRA CLUB, TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE? HOW INVESTMENT
RULES THREATEN THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE PROTECTION, available at
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/resources/Investor-State-Climate-TPP-6-4.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE].
36. See UNEP, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. DARA, REPORT: CLIMATE CRISIS ALREADY CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED
DAMAGE TO WORLD ECONOMY; HUMAN IMPACT ON LARGE-SCALE (2012),
available
at
http://daraint.org/wp-
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already costing the world $1.2 trillion a year in foregone
39
prosperity. Consequently, countries must consider the effects
that an increase in trade will have on the environment before
contemplating new FTAs. If the environmental issues are not
addressed when drafting new FTAs, then the trade becomes far
40
from free.
This article examines the proposed expanded version of the
TPP and its potential environmental effects. Part II examines
the specific environmental effects of two previous multilateral
trade agreements entered into by the United States. Part III
discusses the TPP itself, the environmental areas it could
influence, and the benefits of including environment provisions
that promote sustainability within the TPP. Part IV proposes
solutions to ensure that the TPP adequately protects
environmental interests. The article concludes by analyzing the
likelihood that the TPP would succeed in its environmental
goals.
II.

THE EFFECTS OF FTAS ON THE ENVIRONMENT

Free trade efforts and environmental protection have
41
seldom gone hand in hand; although the World Trade
Organization believes there is no reason that the two cannot do
42
so. However, before they can be reconciled the nearly limitless
permutations by which an FTA can affect the environment
43
must be realized. The links between free trade agreements
and the environment include production, management,
technology, physical infrastructure, social organization, and
44
government policy. The policy and structure behind a FTA, as
content/uploads/2012/09/CVM_RELEASE_FINAL_ENGLISH.pdf (last visited
Oct. 19, 2013).
39. Id.
40. See TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE, supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh, Full
text of the Decision on Trade and Environment (Apr. 14, 1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm (calling for the
establishment of a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) on the
occasion of signing the Marrakesh Agreement).
43. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. [FAO], International Trade, the
Environment and Sustainable Agricultural Development, THE STATE OF FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE: ENTERING A NEW ERA?, 278–92
(1995), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/v6800e/v6800e.pdf.
44. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation [CEC], Analytic Framework for
Assessing the Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade
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well as the economic, political, or legal means it utilizes can
45
also determine the extent of its impact on the environment.
For example, although increases in production and physical
infrastructure are likely to negatively impact the environment,
government policy offers, perhaps, the most visible and
46
effective way for an FTA to combat such impact. Governments
provide environmental support through direct expenditures,
tax regimes, credit, subsidies, user-charges, set-asides, and
47
conservation
programs.
Governments
also
provide
environmental support through the regulation of negative
48
factors, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Still, too
much regulation should be avoided to prevent the risk of
stifling trade and defeating the underlying purpose of the
49
FTA.
Determining an efficient level of FTA regulation depends
greatly on discovering the environmental effects of a certain
50
FTA, which can prove problematic. Environmental changes,
such as increases in GHG emissions or decreases in air quality
or biodiversity, are often caused by multiple factors, making
them difficult to measure and hard to attribute to just one
51
FTA. Still, most global indicators demonstrate an overall
52
environmental decline that shows no sign of slowing down.
Agreement,
at
1,
59
(1999),
available
at
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/trade_environ_econ/pdfs/frmwrk-e.pdf.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 59.
47. Id. at 73.
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 70.
51. See generally UNEP, Reference Manual for the Integrated Assessment
of Trade-Related Policies (2001), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/
publications/intAssessment/refmaniaFinal.pdf.; Colin Kirkpatrick & Norman
Lee, Inst.for Dev. Policy and Mgmt., Univ. of Manchester, Further
Development of the Methodology for a Sustainability Impact Assessment of
Proposed WTO Negotiations: Final Report to the European Commission (2002),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/february/tradoc_112353.pdf;
Alejandro Nedal, CEC, Issue Study 1. Maize in Mexico: Some Environmental
Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement, available at
http://www.cec.org/Storage/52/4483_engmaize_EN.pdf.
52. See XAVIER LEFLAIVE, ET AL., Water, in OECD ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTLOOK TO 2050: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION 207–73 (2012); WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT 2012: BIODIVERSITY, BIOCAPACITY,
AND BETTER CHOICES (Monique Grooten et al. eds., 2012); Air Pollution
Worsening Worldwide: Cut Emissions Further, Experts Urge, SCI. DAILY, Aug.
1, 2012, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120801112609.htm.
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Furthermore, with the world population predicted to reach 9
53
billion by 2050, the increased threat of environmental scarcity
will make operating an efficient international trade system,
predicated upon the neoclassical trade theory of comparative
54
advantage, a market and economic imperative.
III.

MULTILATERAL FTAS INVOLVING THE UNITED
STATES

A well-known premise is that past behavior is the best
indicator of future behavior. Thus, by examining the
environmental effects of past trade agreements, and how they
dealt with environmental issues, we can ascertain a reasonable
expectation of the environmental impact of the TPP.
A.NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
55
came into force in 1994. Signed by the United States, Canada,
and Mexico, NAFTA created the largest free trade area in the
56
world. So far, NAFTA has accomplished its goal to increase
trade and eliminate barriers to trade and investment between
57
these countries. From 1993 to 2010, U.S. exports to Canada
58
and Mexico rose 190%. Often credited as the first FTA of its
kind in sheer size and influence, NAFTA is also the first
59
multilateral FTA to include environmental provisions. After
53. U.N.: Earth's Population to Hit 9 Billion by 2050, 10 Billion by 2100,
CNN,
May
4,
2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0503/us/united.nations.population.forecast_1_population-forecast-populationgrowth-fertility?_s=PM:US.
54. See Rüdiger Pethig, Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in
the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 2 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 160, 160
(1976).
55. North American Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, http://www.ustr.gov
/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-tradeagreement-nafta (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Dale Colyer, Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Trade under
NAFTA (Feb. 2–6, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Southern Agricultural Economics Association, West Virginia
University), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19104/1
/cp02co01.pdf.
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pressure from the Clinton administration to address
environmental problems, the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was negotiated and
60
signed as a supplement to NAFTA. NAAEC’s primary focus
was to ensure that each NAFTA member effectively enforced
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate
61
governmental action; thereby preventing a race to the bottom
scenario in which the least environmentally conscious country
62
received the most investment.
To pursue this goal, the NAAEC established an
intergovernmental
organization,
the
Commission
for
63
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC consists of the
64
65
Council, Secretariat, and Joint Public Advisory Committee
66
(JPAC), and fosters cooperation between NAFTA members to
67
address the environmental issues of continent-wide free trade.
The CEC examines environmental trends in the region and
68
advocates for environmental solutions. For example, the CEC
proposed the development of an integrated North American
electricity market that would maintain high levels of
69
environmental protection. The CEC also identified areas of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mark R. Goldschmidt, Note, The Role of Transparency and Public
Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 343, 356 (2001–02) (explaining that the Council serves as the forum for
the discussion and promotion of environmental policies, and oversees the
Secretariat by approving or overruling decisions).
65. Id. at 357 (noting that the Secretariat holds responsibility for most of
the Commission's activities; including completing the Annual Report of the
Commission and reviewing Submissions on Enforcement Matters from
external parties).
66. Id. at 358 (noting that the JPAC, a fifteen-member panel, primarily
provides advice to the Council or Secretariat using technical or scientific
information).
67. CEC, Three Countries: One Environment (2006), available at
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=310&BL_ExpandID=
154 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
68. Stephen P. Mumme, NAFTA and Environment: The North American
Free Trade Agreement’s Impact on the Trinational Environment Remains
Controversial, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.
fpif.org/reports/nafta_and_environment.
69. Secretariat of the CEC, Environmental Challenges and Opportunities
of the Evolving North American Electricity Market (June 2002), available at
http://www.cec.org/Storage/31/2244_CEC_Art13electricity_Eng.pdf.
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improvement in GHG inventory, comparability, and structure
70
that would help mitigate climate change. The CEC also
monitors NAFTA’s environmental impacts in areas such as
71
pollution. Thus far, studies have been mixed, showing no
72
general or overall environmental effect.
While the CEC has successfully created greater
environmental awareness in NAFTA, it falls short of holding
73
member countries to a high environmental standard. The
74
CEC has no authority to enforce compliance. The NAAEC
contains no provisions that allow the CEC to investigate
unenforced regulations or examine decisions that roll back
75
environmental laws. Even if the CEC had such authority,
with an annual budget of only $9 million, (the same budget it
received at its 1994 inception), its potential to influence
76
environmental protection would be limited. Despite a $140
million investment from NAFTA members, the CEC has done
little to achieve its principal mandates or to foster tangible
77
changes in government action. Furthermore, there is little if
any evidence that the CEC work has influenced NAFTA
78
members’ trade policies. Although the NAAEC adds little in
terms of environmental protection to NAFTA, it may be unfair
70. CEC, Improving Comparability of Emissions Data, Methodologies and
Inventories in North America, available at http://www.cec.org/Storage
/130/15491_ghg_cec_projectsummary_en_web.pdf.
71. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Reinert & David W. Roland-Holst, CEC of N.
Am., The Industrial Pollution Impacts of NAFTA: Some Preliminary Results
(2000),
available
at
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/trade_environ_econ/pdfs/Reinert.pdf.
72. See Symposium, The Environmental Effects of Free Trade, Papers
Presented at the North American Symposium on Assessing the Linkages
between Trade and Environment, COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOP. OF N. AM. (2000),
available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/45/3763_symposium-e.pdf.
73. See Chris Dove, Comment, Can Voluntary Compliance Protect the
Environment?: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 881.
74. Id. at 882–83.
75. Id. at 881.
76. Katie Harr, NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the Role of the Environment,
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.coha.org/naftacafta-dr-and-the-role-of-the-environment/.
77. Linda J. Allen, The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation: Has It Fulfilled Its Promises and Potential? An Empirical Study
of Policy, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 121 (2012).
78. GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 302 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds.,
2003).

VINCENT Article

2014]

2/27/2014 5:59 PM

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

11

to hold the treaty to a high standard considering it was the first
FTA to include an environmental provision; NAFTA is, after
all, first and foremost an economic agreement. Indeed, some
environmental experts argue that the “most significant
achievement of the environmental clauses [is] the fact that they
79
existed at all . . . .”
1.NAFTA Chapter 11
Chapter 11 of NAFTA contains provisions designed to
protect cross-border investors and facilitate the settlement of
80
investment disputes. Article 1110, the investor-state dispute
settlement provision, provides:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor of another
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment
(“expropriation”), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with
81
paragraphs 2 through 6.
Disputes under this section and the process for settling
82
them have come under enormous scrutiny. Chapter 11
establishes a mechanism for settling investment disputes. A
NAFTA investor alleging that a host government breached its
investment obligations under Chapter 11 may, at its option,
83
pursue recourse under one of three arbitral mechanisms. The
79. Harr, supra note 76.
80. North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 639 [hereinafter NAFTA].
81. Id. at 641-42.
82. Bernard J. Roth, NAFTA, Alberta Oil Sands Royalties, and Change:
Yes We Can?, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 335, 363–64 (2009).
83. Overview of Disputes Between a Party and an Investor of Another
Party, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?
tabid=93&language=en-US#Chapter11 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (noting that
the three arbitral mechanisms available are the World Bank's International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the ICSID's
Additional Facility Rules, and the rules of the United Nations Commission for
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Chapter also indicates that “the investor may choose the
84
remedies available in the host country’s domestic courts.”
85
Three-member tribunals hear investor-state arbitrations.
Tribunals must decide the disputes in accordance with the
Agreement’s provisions, the applicable rules of international
law, and all notes of interpretation issued by the NAFTA
86
Commission.
On its face, Article 1110 does not pose any potential
threats to environmental protection. NAFTA’s drafters erred,
87
however, by failing to expressly define expropriation. As a
result, arbitrators’ interpretation of the phrase “tantamount to
88
expropriation” has seriously affected governments’ ability to
protect the environment, as demonstrated by the following
three cases.
a.Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico
The first case to interpret Chapter 11, Article 1110 was
filed in 1997 by Metalclad Corporation, an American waste
89
disposal company. In 1993, Metalclad purchased Coterin, a
company that had secured a piece of land in the Mexican State
of San Luis Potosi. Metalclad purchased the property with an
assurance from Coterin and the Mexican federal government
that all the necessary state and federal building permits to
construct and operate a hazardous waste landfill on the land
90
would be received. In 1994, Metalclad started construction on
the landfill, despite the governor’s statement that he did not
91
plan to grant Metalclad’s building permit. Federal officials
assured Metalclad that the Guadalcazar municipality could not
deny the permit and that the application was merely a
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules)).
84. Id.
85. NAFTA, supra note 80, at 644 (outlining that each party names one
arbitrator, with the third arbitrator selected by mutual agreement, or failing
agreement, by the Secretary-General of ICSID).
86. Id. at 645.
87. Roth, supra note 82, at 363.
88. NAFTA, supra note 80, at 644.
89. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/97/1, Final Award, ¶ 8 (August 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002)
[hereinafter Metalclad Final Award].
90. Stephen Kass & Jean McCarroll, The ‘Metalclad’ Decision Under
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, N. Y. L. J. 3 (2000).
91. Id.
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formality. However, when Metalclad attempted to open its
new facility, local demonstrators and officials blocked the
opening and the landfill remained closed until November
93
1995.
In November 1995 Metalclad entered into an agreement
94
with two federal agencies and the facility began operation.
Yet, in December 1995 Guadalcazar once again rejected
95
Metalclad’s petition for a municipal building permit.
Guadalcazar also brought action against the federal
government for illegally operating the landfill and successfully
obtained a preliminary injunction barring further operations at
96
the site. In September 1997 the governor issued a state-level
decree that established the landfill site as a protected national
97
property. Metalclad responded by filing a claim under Articles
98
1105 and 1110 of NAFTA. The arbitral tribunal found in favor
of Metalclad and awarded the company over $16 million in
99
damages.
While the arbitral tribunal had good reason to find the
Mexican federal government at fault under Article 1110, it
should not have found the state of Mexico at fault, as well. By
doing so, the tribunal interpreted Article 1110 too broadly. The
tribunal found that:
Expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such
as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of
title in favor of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-beexpected economic benefit of property even if not
100
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Metalclad Final Award, supra note 89, at ¶131.
Id. at ¶103.
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Incidental interference with the use of property that
significantly deprives the owner of an important part of the
expected benefit could apply to many scenarios where the
government attempts to improve environmental protection
101
laws. A wide application of this interpretation could have
chilling effects on environmental regulation. It could result in
lowered standards, because any law which limits carbon
emissions, restricts pollutants, or sets other environmental
102
standards has the potential to cause a loss of property.
Furthermore, although the tribunal did not award Metalclad
losses for expected profits due to a lack of evidence, it
recognized that lost profits should be considered in the
103
valuation of expropriated property. By leaving the door open
to award investors their lost profits, local governments could be
forced to pay enormous damages or settlements when future
claims arise.
b.Ethyl Corporation v. Canada
The chilling effects of the Metalclad decision were realized
in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada. Ethyl Corporation is an American
104
chemical company that produces the gasoline additive MMT
105
and was the sole supplier of MMT in Canada. In April 1997,
Canada imposed a ban on the import and interprovincial
transport of MMT, effectively eliminating MMT from Canadian
106
gasoline. In passing the ban, the Canadian government cited
its goals as tightening vehicle emissions standards, controlling
air pollution, and preventing exposure of workers and drivers
107
to airborne manganese particles via MMT. A majority of
countries do not use MMT and several countries and states,

101. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., “INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION”
“RIGHT TO REGULATE” IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 16
(2004).
102. Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental
Protection in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from
the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 103, 110–11 (2007).
103. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 90, at 3.
104. MMT stands for methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl. Id.
105. Michelle Sforza & Mark Valliantos, NAFTA & Environment Laws:
Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL P OL ’Y F. (APRIL 1997),
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45381.html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
AND THE
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including California, have banned it. The same month that
Canada implemented its ban on MMT, Ethyl Corporation filed
a Chapter 11 investor-state claim against the Canadian
government for $250 million in damages, citing indirect
109
expropriation of its assets under Article 1110. After a NAFTA
tribunal accepted jurisdiction over the claim, the Canadian
government settled with Ethyl for $13 million, reversed its ban
on MMT, and issued a public statement that “current scientific
110
information” did not demonstrate MMT’s toxicity.
The outcome is evidence of Chapter 11’s direct effect on
environmental legislation; the threat of a $250 million fallout
was enough for the Canadian government to settle and drop the
111
MMT ban. Although the health effects of MMT are still under
112
debate, it would have been more logical to err on the side of
caution in legislating and regulating products related to health
and the environment. It also seems counter-intuitive that an
American corporation could sue the Canadian government for a
ban on MMT, but had no recourse in its own country against
California’s ban. It is entirely possible that Canada may have
defeated Ethyl’s claim, but the merits of the case were never
decided. Metalclad gave the Canadian government enough
reason to doubt its chances.
c.Methanex Corporation v. California
The outcomes of Metalclad and Ethyl Corp. gave
environmentalists serious concerns about the increasing scope
of investor-state claims, but in 1995 Methanex v. California
helped relieve some of the worry. Methanex is the world’s
largest producer of methanol, a chemical used to produce
113
MTBE, a gasoline oxygenate designed to reduce harmful auto
108. Michael P. Walsh, The Global Experience with Lead in Gasoline and
the Lessons We Should Apply to the Use of MMT, 50 AM. J. OF INDUS. MED.
853, 853–60 (2007).
109. Sforza & Valliantos, supra note 105.
110. Ken Traynor, NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal Environmental
Protection or, How NAFTA Became a Shill for Ethyl Corp., 23 INTERVENOR ,
JULY –S EPT . 1998, at 6.
111. Id.
112. Walsh, supra note 108, at 859 (adding that the $13 million settlement
alone exceeded Canada’s budget for environmental enforcement and
compliance programs).
113. MTBE stands for methyl tertiary-butyl ether. Methanex Corp. v.
United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44
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114

emissions.
Studies indicate that MTBE causes significant
water contamination and it has been associated with human
115
neurotoxicological effects. Other studies show MTBE to be an
animal carcinogen with the potential to cause cancer in
116
humans. In March 1999, the governor of California issued an
Executive Order requiring the phase-out of MTBE in the state’s
gasoline by 2002 because of evidence that MTBE had
117
contaminated drinking water wells and systems. At the time,
17 states had banned MTBE or were in the process of
118
restricting it.
In response to the ban, Methanex filed a Chapter 11
investor-state claim against the California Executive Order
seeking to either lift the ban or to be compensated $970 million
119
for future lost profits. Methanex argued that the California
Executive Order violated several provisions of NAFTA,
including Article 1110, because the ban was tantamount to an
120
expropriation of the company’s investment. In August 2005,
after almost six years, the tribunal ruled to dismiss all claims,
121
including the claim under Article 1110.
In denying
Methanex’s claim, the tribunal significantly limited the scope of
the expropriation clause from its broad interpretation in
Metalclad. The Panel stated that:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a nondiscriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is
not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless
specific commitments had been given by the
regulating government to the then putative foreign
investor
contemplating
investment
that
the

I.L.M. 1345, 1368 (2005) [hereinafter Methanex Final Award].
114. Id.
115. Mary Bottari, NAFTA’s Investor “Rights:” A Corporate Dream, A
Citizen Nightmare, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR MAG., Apr. 2001, at 10.
116. PUB. CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES: LESSONS
FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (2005), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAReport_Final.pdf.
117. Methanex Final Award, supra note 113, at 1370.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1345.
120. Id. at 1371.
121. Id. at 1462.
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government would refrain from such regulation.

This decision signified a big victory for environmentalists;
it held that non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose
is not considered expropriation under NAFTA, and, therefore,
governments are not required to compensate foreign
123
investors.
An exception still applies to situations like
Metalcad, where the government made commitments to foreign
investors that it would refrain from such regulation. Thus, the
Methanex tribunal reconciled the Metalclad decision with its
interpretation of the expropriation clause, thereby limiting the
scope of Article 1110 and providing governments the legal
standing to regulate environmental matters without breaking
124
NAFTA rules.
While Methanex was an immediate victory for
environmentalists, the deeper implications of investor-state
claims could still impact a government’s ability to protect the
environment in the future. Methanex suggests the undesirable
scenario where foreign companies receive broad protection
under the expropriation clause but domestic companies do not,
thus creating an uneven playing field that encourages countries
125
to drop environmental standards further.
The concern
remains that a claim against a state’s legitimate regulatory
action could require the state to pay compensation to the
126
claimant. These concerns, as well as the length and cost of
arbitration, cause a chilling effect on public authorities, as seen
127
in Ethyl Corp. Even worse, public authorities may choose not
to enforce current regulations against foreign investors for fear
128
of a Chapter 11 claim. Methanex lessens these fears to an
122. Id. at 1456.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 116, at 8.
126. See S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial Award, Separate Opinion by Dr.
Bryan Schwartz, at 86 (Nov. 12 2000), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-19.pdf.
127. PUB. CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES:
BANKRUPTING
DEMOCRACY
vii
(2001),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF (“In the end, the government
of Canada settled the case by revoking the ban . . . .”).
128. Id. (“[T]he potential for large multinational corporations to bully the
government of the weakest and poorest countries of the hemisphere would be
extraordinary. The mere threat of a vast damage award and high cost of
defending a suit could make poorer nations concede before the fight had been
joined . . . .”); See also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in
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extent and to date very few claims have succeeded under
129
Chapter 11, although large claims continue to be filed under
130
NAFTA. While concerns under NAFTA remain, the United
States has the ability to learn from past oversights in future
131
trade agreements to better address environmental concerns.
2.Dominican Republic-Central
Agreement

America-Free

Trade

Based on the perceived economic success of NAFTA, the
United States became a party to another multilateral FTA in
2004, joining Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic in signing the
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
132
(CAFTA-DR). Based largely on the shortcomings of NAFTA,
the agreement did not receive overwhelming support and only
narrowly garnered majority support in both houses of
133
Congress. Despite mixed support in Congress, the agreement
represented a way to stimulate growth, foster stability, and lay
134
the foundation for further cooperation in the region.
In drafting the new trade agreement, the United States
realized the inherent weaknesses in NAFTA’s inadequate
Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1438 (2003) (“One understandable concern is
that the specter of ruinous liability might restrain lawmakers from acting in
the public interest.”).
129. See Coe, supra note 128. (“The staggering numbers accompanying the
Chapter 11 prayers for relief, though making sensational headlines, are
misleading . . . [a]pproximately fifteen Chapter 11 cases have come to a
conclusion. Two have settled, five seem to have been abandoned . . . and eight
have reached an adjudicated outcome. Only Metalclad and Myers have ended
in awards of arguably significant compensation.”).
130. Ilana Solomon & Deb Nardone, Fracking Causes Friction Between
Trade and Environment, SIERRA CLUB (Nov. 16, 2012), http://sierraclub.
typepad.com/compass/2012/11/nafta-fracking-case.html (citing example of a
$250 million claim by an American firm against Canada’s ban on fracking in
November 2012).
131. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 127, at 30 (“[T]he firm succeeded in a
regulatory takings claim . . . sent alarm bells through national associations
representing state and local officials and Congress. As a result . . . Congress
instructed the USTR to ensure that future trade agreements would not permit
this type of regulatory takings claim.”).
132. J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42468, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(CAFTA-DR): DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1 (2012).
133. The vote was 217 to 215. Id.
134. Id.
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environmental protection. As a result, the United States made
strengthening environmental provisions in CAFTA-DR a
priority. The USTR even went so far as to promote CAFTA-DR
135
as a significant improvement upon NAFTA.
It endorsed
CAFTA-DR as having “real teeth, including binding dispute
settlement, monetary fines directed at solving problems, and
potential trade sanctions,” as well as “[a] first-ever citizen
participation process [that] will identify and find solutions for
136
trade-related environmental problems.”
At first glance, CAFTA-DR seems to significantly improve
upon NAFTA and includes many replications of NAFTA’s
environmental provisions. Similar to NAFTA, CAFTA-DR
contains many pro-environment provisions in Chapter 17, but
137
is without any enforcement measures.
CAFTA-DR
encourages countries to strengthen environmental regulation
at all levels, but it neither requires them to do so nor gives
138
them incentives for such action. According to proponents of
CAFTA-DR, its programs provide “assistance to over 340
companies in cleaner production technologies that promote
energy and water conservation and reductions in waste, raw
material use, and emissions; and train more than 13,000 people
in enforcement and implementation of environmental laws,
139
public participation, and cleaner production practices.”
CAFTA-DR seems more like a promotional tool; true gains
in environmental protection occur when countries are
135. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA FACTS (June
2005), http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA
/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file133_7801.pdf.
136. Id.
137. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States-Free Trade
Agreement ch. 17, art. 17, Aug. 5, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7157 [hereinafter
CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text.
138. See id. at art. 17.1 (“Party shall ensure that its laws and policies
provide for and encourage high levels of environmental protection, and shall
strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.”); See also David A.
Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican RepublicUnited States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 403–
05 (2007) (“Given . . . the use of monetary assessments as an alternative to
trade sanctions generally, and the only remedy for . . . environmental disputes,
it is not surprising that there is a mechanism which provides for a review of
the effectiveness of these provisions.”).
139. Rebecca Slocum, Promoting Trade and a Better Environment: CAFTADR Environmental Cooperation, DIPNOTE, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. OFFICIAL BLOG
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/02/21/promoting-trade-andbetter-environment-cafta-dr-environmental-cooperation.
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inherently committed to enacting and enforcing environmental
140
protection legislation. Chapter 17 of CAFTA-DR contains a
provision asserting that a country “shall not fail to effectively
141
enforce its environmental laws.”
If a country fails to
effectively enforce its laws, a claim can be made by another
country under Chapter 20, which deals with state-to-state
142
disputes. However, Chapter 20 falls short, only punishing
“sustained or reoccurring” instances of non-enforcement of
environmental provisions; first-time offenders will not be
143
punished.
Once the arbitration panel concludes that a country has
failed to implement environmental regulations, trade sanctions
144
are not an available remedy. The only remedy available is an
assessment limited to $15 million to be paid into a fund for
145
improving
environmental
enforcement
provisions.
Consequently, if a country benefits by more than $15 million by
not enforcing its environmental laws, it would have few
practical incentives to do so, especially considering the lack of
146
other trade sanctions or direct payment to said country.
CAFTA-DR members also lack the incentive to file a Chapter
147
20 claim given the high threshold for state-to-state claims.
The high threshold, combined with the small monetary remedy
if successful, makes it unlikely any state would risk alienating
the offending state to pursue a claim. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
there has only been one state-to-state claim pursuant to
Chapter 20 since CAFTA-DR’s inception, unrelated to the
148
environment.
CAFTA-DR has, however, improved upon NAFTA in two
major areas related to investor-state claims. First, the drafters
of CAFTA-DR corrected the overall lack of transparency in the
arbitration process that was rightfully criticized by
149
environmentalists and legal scholars. To make the dispute
140. See Generally Gantz, supra note 138 (arguing that the enforcement
provision of Chapter 20 is burdensome and of questionable effectiveness).
141. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 17.2.1.
142. See id. at art. 20.
143. Id.
144. Id. at art. 20.17.
145. Id.
146. See Gantz, supra note 138, at 404.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See CHRISTIAN LEATHLEY, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
LATIN AMERICA: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 230-40 (2007) (providing an
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resolution process more transparent, the drafters made many
150
critical changes. For example, CAFTA-DR requires that all
major documents involving investor-state claims be made
151
public and allows the court to consider amicus curiae briefs
from third parties. Disputing parties may review the proposed
decision or award and submit written comments within 60 days
152
for the tribunal to consider. The tribunal may award costs
and attorneys’ fees if it considers the claim or the respondent’s
153
objection “frivolous.” These provisions improve NAFTA by
providing more oversight, more participation by interested
third parties, and more public awareness.
Second, CAFTA-DR heavily improved upon its predecessor
NAFTA by limiting the types of investor-state claims. While
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10 on Investment is nearly identical to
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, it includes a significant addition in its
154
Annex.
Annex 10-C addresses expropriation by further
defining and narrowing an investor’s ability to recover due to
indirect expropriation. There are two types of expropriation:
direct and indirect. Direct expropriation occurs when an
investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure. Indirect
expropriation occurs when an action or series of actions by a
party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation, but
155
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
To
determine whether there has been an indirect expropriation,
several factors are considered: (1) the economic impact of the
government action, (2) the extent to which the government
action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
156
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.
Annex 10-C adds, “except in rare circumstances,
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
overview of the NAFTA’s blunders which CAFTA-DR attempted to rectify or
avoid).
150. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 10.7.1.; LEATHLEY, supra note 149,
at 232 (“[I]nvestors under the US-CAFTA-DR can expect certain information
to be made public . . . .”).
151. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 10.7.1.
152. Id. at arts.10.20.3, 9.
153. Id. at art. 10.20.6.
154. Id. at Annex 10.
155. Id. at Annex 10-C.
156. Id. at Annex 10-C(4)(a).
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expropriations.” Annex 10-C does not give examples of what
those “rare circumstances” might be. However, by narrowly
defining expropriation and clearly delineating the types of
disputes the provision applies to, the drafters created a more
effective rule to follow. Parties now have a stronger foundation
for holding environmental regulation claims to a higher
standard.
Thus far, redefining expropriation has had a seemingly
positive effect on curbing state-investor disputes over
environmental public welfare objectives. Only one claim has
been filed since CAFTA-DR’s inception in 2004, and the claim
was ultimately dismissed under the expropriation clause in
158
Article 10.7. While an arbitral interpretation of expropriation
under CAFTA-DR’s definition would be beneficial, the lack of
claims filed is a sign that environmental actions and
regulations have more protection under CAFTA-DR than
NAFTA.
IV. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
Despite the poor environmental record of the United States
on prior FTAs, there have been some indications that the TPP
will include strong environmental protection provisions. At the
2008 Democratic National Convention, Barack Obama’s party
pledged to “not negotiate bilateral trade agreements that stop
159
the government from protecting the environment.” In 2012,
the USTR spokesperson, Nkenge Harmon, provided a
statement on the Obama administration’s position:
[The Obama] administration is committed to ensuring
strong environmental . . . laws. Nothing in our TPP
investment proposal could impair our government’s
ability to pursue legitimate, non-discriminatory public
interest regulation, including measures to protect . . .
157. Id.
158. Pac Rim Cayman, LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 1.10 (June 1, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0935.pdf.
159. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION COMM., RENEWING AMERICA’S
PROMISE (2008) (Presented to the 2008 Democratic National Convention by
the
Platform
Standing
Committee),
available
at
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/01
/2008DemocraticPlatformbyCmte_08-13-08.pdf.
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160

the environment.

In August 2010, USTR officials announced that all TPP
participants, despite differences in levels of development, would
be required to meet the same labor and environmental
161
conditions;
USTR official, Mark Linscott, stated that an
“environment chapter in the TPP should strengthen countries’
commitments to enforce their environmental laws and
regulations, including areas related to ocean and fisheries
governance, through the effective enforcement obligation
162
subject to dispute settlement.”
Other negotiating members of the TPP have shown their
commitment to protecting the environment as well. The
original four TPP members included an Environmental
Cooperation Agreement in the original trade agreement, which
outlined the parties’ commitment to a high level of
163
environmental
protection.
In
addition,
Australia’s
government has stated it
[D]oes not support provisions that would confer
greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those
available to domestic businesses. Nor will the
Government support provisions that would constrain
the ability of Australian governments to make laws
on . . . environmental . . . matters in circumstances
where those laws do not discriminate between
164
domestic and foreign businesses.
160. Zach Carter, Obama Trade Document Leaked, Revealing New
Corporate Powers and Broken Campaign Promises, HUFFINGTON POST (June
13, 2012, 9:17AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/13/obama-trade-documentleak_n_1592593.html.
161. Amy Tsui, Labor, Environmental Standards to be Same Across all
Eight TPP Countries, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. 1261 (2010).
162. Marine Wealth: Promoting Conservation and Advancing American
Exports: Hearing before the S. Subcomm. on Int’l Trade, Customs and Global
Competitiveness, 111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony of Mark Linscott,
Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Env’t and Natural Res.), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/071410mltest.pdf.
163. See Environment Cooperation Agreement Among the Parties to the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, NEW ZEALAND
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN
AFF.
&
TRADE,
http://www.mfat.govt.nz
/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/environment-agreement.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 19, 2013).
164. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GUILLARD
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS
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The United States has also supported the reduction of
165
tariffs on environmental goods, while New Zealand and Chile
166
reportedly have tabled trade and climate change submissions.
There is, however, cause for concern that the TPP will not
adequately protect environmental interests. It is not an easy
task getting eleven or more countries to agree on any type of
international law, but environmental provisions are an
especially difficult topic. Accordingly, the environmental
chapter has emerged as one of the most challenging areas of
167
the negotiations. Developing nations are the most concerned
with including environmental provisions, as they would be at a
disadvantage if they must adhere to the same standards as
168
developed nations.
Enforcement is also a major issue as
several parties do not want to make environmental obligations
binding under the TPP dispute settlement mechanism as the
169
United States has proposed. Even though New Zealand has
proposed including climate change provisions in the TPP, its
support has been limited to a non-binding affirmation of the
170
benefit of pricing carbon. It remains uncertain how hard the
United States will push for strict environmental provisions
where it may conflict with its other interests regarding drafting
of the TPP.
Chinese scholars believe that successful implementation of
the TPP will have a negative economic and geopolitical impact
on China “as a force that could rip apart the regional economic
171
integration of East Asia.”
This has led many people to
PROSPERITY
14
(April,
2011)
available
at
http://pdf.aigroup.asn.au/trade/Gillard%20Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf.
165. U.S. Pushes Conservation Initiatives for Proposed Trans-Pacific Pact,
INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/121000/.
166. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).
167. Key Areas Of TPP Talks At Different Stages After 30 Months Of Effort,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE’S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-TradeOnline/key-areas-of-tpp-talks-at-different-stages-after-30-months-ofeffort/menu-id-896.html.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Guoyou Song & Wen Jin Yuan, China’s Free Trade Agreement
Strategies, WASH. Q. (Fall 2012), available at http://csis.org/files
/publication/twq12FallSongYuan.pdf; Jianmin Jin,
China’s Concerns
Regarding TPP No More than Empty Worries?, FUJITSU RES. INST. (Jan. 11,
AND
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speculate, including members of the press in China, that the
United States is using the TPP to marginalize China’s
172
influence in Asia.
During the 2012 presidential debates,
President Obama said, “we’re organizing trade relations with
countries other than China so that China starts feeling more
173
pressure about meeting basic international standards.”
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that China
174
has an open invitation to join TPP talks. However, there is no
evidence that China would have any additional influence over
the terms of the TPP. With the current concerns over China’s
growing economic influence, the United States may be using
the TPP to force China either to “meet basic international
standards” or else risk substantial trade losses to countries in
their own region. If this truly is the main priority of the TPP
from the American perspective, environmental provisions could
be threatened with elimination if they become too controversial.
Many believe that China’s undervalued currency is a mounting
foreign policy concern that may take precedence over
175
international environmental goals.
Another part of the concern stems from the intense secrecy
that has surrounded the TPP negotiations. Even though
negotiations have been ongoing since 2008, the negotiating
partners have not been willing to offer any details of the trade
176
documents or drafts.
While 600 representatives of
corporations have access to draft versions of the TPP, they are
177
restricted from sharing the information with the public.
The lack of transparency is especially alarming considering
the Obama administration is expected to ask Congress for
2012), http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/message/2012/2012-01-11.html.
172. Song & Yuan, supra note 171; Jin, supra note 171.
173. Tom Miles, US-led US-Asian Pact Spurs China's Asian Trade Bloc,
S.Korea Minister Says, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2012, 6:12 AM), http://in.reuters.com
/article/2012/11/06/trade-china-bloc-idINDEE8A500A20121106.
174. Clinton: China Welcome in TPP, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 17, 2012,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/321762/clinton-welcomes-china-tojoin-trade-pact.
175. Chad Karnes, What Does China's 'Currency Manipulation' mean for
the
Dollar?,
YAHOO!
FINANCE
(Oct.
17,
2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-chinas-currency-manipulation-mean220039282.html.
176. Mike Delrio, Secrecy Surrounding Trade Talks Reflects Obama
Administration
Transparency,
EXAMINER.COM
(June
25,
2012),
http://www.examiner.com/article/secrecy-surrounding-trade-talks-reflectsobama-adminstration-transparency.
177. Id.
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178

Trade Promotion Authority, which would give the President
the authority to negotiate international agreements that
179
Congress can approve or disapprove but not amend. Congress
created the power of trade promotion authority in the Trade
180
Act of 1974. The power created by this act would allow the
President to sign the TPP before a Congressional vote and
imposes rules on Congress that limit debate and prevent
amendments, resulting in a straight up or down vote on the
181
TPP. Ron Kirk, USTR from March 18, 2009 to March 15,
2013, was remarkably forthright in revealing his opposition to
making the text public: “doing so, he suggested to Reuters,
would raise such opposition that it could make the deal
182
impossible to sign.”
Such an approach to the adoption of an FTA, where
Congress and citizens have negligible input in the negotiations,
could put Congress in a tough position. Forcing an up or down
vote on the text of the TPP requires Congress to choose
between the status quo and whatever agreement to which the
President and the TPP member countries agree. Absent Trade
Promotion Authority, Congress would have the ability to
amend any provisions of the TPP; however, the vast number of
countries involved, combined with the number of years it has
taken to negotiate, essentially dictates that member countries
be prevented from proposing amendments after the agreement
is finalized. Bearing this in mind, it makes it more imperative
that members of Congress have input in the TPP while it is still
being negotiated in order to increase the chances that tough
environmental provisions are included.
178. Id.
179. CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK
NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: MAJOR VOTES (2011). If
the President transmits a trade agreement to Congress, then the majority
leaders of the House and Senate or their designees must introduce the
implementing bill submitted by the President on the first day on which their
House is in session. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)(1) (2006). Senators and
Representatives may not amend the President’s bill, either in committee or in
the Senate or House. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d). The committees to which the bill has
been referred have 45 days after its introduction to report the bill, or be
automatically discharged, and each House must vote within 15 days after the
bill is reported or discharged. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(1).
180. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191–2194.
181. Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy, Obama’s Covert Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/opinion/obamas-coverttrade-deal.html?_r=0.
182. Id.
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If the secrecy was not enough to cause concern, a portion of
183
the TPP draft was leaked in June 2012. That draft contained
the TPP’s investment chapter, a section that reveals that TPP
negotiators are considering a dispute resolution process that
would grant transnational corporations special authority to
challenge countries’ laws, regulations and court decisions in
international tribunals that circumvent domestic judicial
184
systems. Environmentalists fear implementation of such a
program would repeat the mistakes of NAFTA and CAFTA185
DR. Article 12.12, the proposed draft of TPP’s language on
investor rights, contains almost identical language on investor
rights as that of CAFTA-DR while the investor-state disputes
186
have the same arbitration procedures.
The investment
chapter did contain Annex 12-D, however, which goes even
further in limiting the scope of investor-state disputes than
CAFTA-DR, which states that:
In order to constitute indirect expropriation, the
state’s deprivation of the investor’s property must be
[either] severe or for an indefinite period [and]
disproportionate to the public purpose. A deprivation
of property shall be particularly likely to constitute
indirect expropriation where it is discriminatory in its
effect, either as against the particular investor or
against a class of which the investor forms part; or in
breach of the state’s prior binding written
commitment to the investor, whether by contract,
187
license or other legal document.
Article 12.15 also states:

183. See generally TPP Draft Text On Investment Reveals Debate on
Capital Controls, INSIDE U.S. TRADE NEWSSTAND, June 15, 2012, at 1, 25-26
(providing commentary on the leaked draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
184. Llana Solomon, NAFTA on Steroids: What it Could Mean for the
Environment,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
July
16,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ilana-solomon/nafta-on-steroids_b_1670748
.html.
185. See id. (discussing the concerns of environmental groups).
186. Compare Newly Leaked TPP Investment Chapter Contains Special
Rights for Corporations, CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, (June 13, 2012),
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.
pdf. (providing relevant text on investor rights), with CAFTA-DR, supra note
137, at art. 10.1-10.31 (providing relevant text on investor rights).
187. CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, supra note 186, at Annex 12-D.

VINCENT Article

28

2/27/2014 5:59 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 23:1

1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to
prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken
in
a
manner
sensitive
to
environmental. . .[concerns] False
2. The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing its health safety
188
or environmental measures . . . .
These improvements to the investment chapter should help
ensure that investors are not able to subvert government
attempts to enforce and enact environmental regulations.
In addition to these provisions, the United States’
environment proposal tabled in September 2011 contains three
189
main components that may be included in the TPP. The main
components are: conservation, core commitments, and public
190
participation. The conservation component focuses on illegal
logging, marine fisheries, endangered species, and prevention
of illegal trade in plants and wildlife while the core
commitments component would require parties to uphold their
commitments to any of the multilateral environmental
191
agreements (MEA) they have signed. The public participation
component would allow stakeholders the ability to challenge a
192
member state’s adherence to the provisions.
While the
current and proposed provisions might seem like victories for
environmental advocates, there are still no observable
enforcement measures to ensure their compliance and similar
versions of these provisions are found in both NAFTA and
193
CAFTA-DR. The United States’ proposal is also lacking any
194
provisions directly aimed at reducing the emissions of GHGs.
188. Id.
189. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 15 (2012).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Compare CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, supra note 186, at 14, with
NAFTA, supra note 80, at 642 (providing relevant NAFTA text on investment
and the environment), and CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at 10.8 (providing
relevant CAFTA-DR text on investment and the environment).
194. USTR Green Paper on Conservation and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF
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If these remain the only environmental provisions
contained in the TPP, then it becomes increasingly likely the
TPP will merely be an extension of NAFTA’s and CAFTA-DR’s
shortcomings when it comes to actively promoting and
enforcing environmental provisions. The TPP could become the
195
largest FTA in history, representing a golden opportunity to
promote the type of tangible environmental sustainability that
was absent from NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. Enforcement
measures are likely the most challenging and controversial
aspect to environmental provisions in the TPP, so there is still
likely to be significant negotiations on those measures before
their inclusion in the draft. However, it is concerning that there
currently is no evidence of basic agreements on enforcement
measures between TPP members.
A.ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
While any increase in trade and production has potential
environmental impacts, the TPP would particularly affect
several specific environmental areas due to the current state of
socioeconomic affairs of its potential members. One such area,
anthropogenic climate change, is a widely recognized global
196
problem.
According to the International Energy Agency,
trends indicate that “delaying action is a false economy” and
that the opportunity cost of preventative action today is less
197
than twenty percent of what would be required after 2020. A
November 2012 World Bank report predicts that the world
PRESIDENT, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011
/ustr-green-paper-conservation-and-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Oct.
5, 2013).
195. See generally What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership? CBC NEWS (June
20, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/what-is-the-trans-pacificpartnership-1.1147888 (providing information on the scope of the TPP).
196. Global Warming Seen as a Major Problem Around the World Less
Concern in the U.S., China and Russia, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/02/global-warming-seen-as-a-majorproblem-around-the-world-less-concern-in-the-us-china-and-russia/ (discussing
the consensus on climate change as a global problem); see also Kristin
Eberhard, New Poll: Americans Believe Global Warming is Real and Threatens
Their Families, SWITCHBOARD NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG
(Oct.
24,
2012),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/new_poll_
americans_believe_glo.html (discussing Americans’ views on climate change).
197. Brad Plumer, When Do We Hit the Point of No Return for Climate
Change?,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
10,
2011,
10:36
AM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/when-do-we-hit-thepoint-of-no-return-for-climate-change/2011/11/10/gIQA4rri8M_blog.html.
THE
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temperature will increase by as much as four degrees Celsius
198
by 2100 if GHGs continue to rise at current rates. This past
century has already seen a 0.8 degrees Celsius increase, and
while governments have vowed to make efforts to limit the
increase to only two degrees Celsius, the authors of the report
do not believe the proposed global efforts, if enacted, will be
199
effective enough to meet their goal. A broad consensus exists
for the proposition that a global mean temperature increase
greater than two degrees Celsius will result in increasingly
costly adaptation and considerable impacts that exceed the
adaptive capacity of many systems and an increasing and
200
unacceptably high risk of large-scale irreversible effects.
201
NAFTA’s members , Mexico, Canada, and the United
States, represent some of the worst offenders for GHG
emissions. The three North American countries are among the
top fifteen countries in terms of GHG emissions; in 2009, the
United States alone accounted for 18.9 percent of the world’s
202
emissions. From 1990 to 2005, GHG emissions increased at
an alarming rate, with increases of 17, 26, and 37 percent in
203
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, respectively. While
emissions from Asian countries, excluding China and India, are
not nearly as large as North American countries, their
emerging economies are expected to produce a very large
204
increase in GHGs over the next few decades.
198. Wendy Koch, World Bank: Climate Change Could Cause Massive
Damage, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2012/11/19/world-bank-warns-climate-change/1715165/.
199. Id.
200. See generally The 2°C Target Information Reference Document of the
EU Climate Change Expert Group ‘EG Science,’ at 3 (July 9, 2008), available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/future/docs
/brochure_2c_en.pdf (discussing the possible negative impacts of a two degree
temperature increase and methods for preventing such outcomes).
201. “The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional
agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America to
implement a free trade area.” Frequently Asked Questions, NAFTA
SECRETARIAT,
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid
=113&language=en-US (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
202. Simon Rogers & Lisa Evans, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by
Country: China Speeds Ahead of the Rest, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2011, 2:20
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/31/world-carbondioxide-emissions-country-data-co2.
203. Jeffrey J. Schott & Meera Fickling, Setting the NAFTA Agenda on
Climate Change, 2009 PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1.
204. Ross Toro, Greenhouse Gases: The Biggest Emitters (Infographic),
LIVESCIENCE (Aug. 26, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.livescience.com/15715-
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Climate change is an environmental concern of the TPP
because of the increases in GHGs resulting from trade
liberalization. FTAs usually result in the increase of exports,
which requires increases in production and transportation.
According to one study, trade liberalization leads to an
expected increase in exports of 3.36 percent per year, which
coincides with an increase of 3.4 percent in transport emissions
205
and 4.3 percent in output related emissions per year.
Numerous econometric studies have found similarly large
positive correlations between instances of trade liberalizing and
206
GHG emissions. Considering that the TPP covers members
that are separated by the Pacific Ocean, the increase in
transport related emissions could be especially significant as 33
percent of trade-related emissions come from international
207
transport.
Many countries have shown their commitment to reducing
GHGs through international agreements such as the Kyoto
208
Protocol. As a trade agreement without any offsetting GHG
provisions will negatively contribute to the increasingly dire
climate situation, countries that are concerned about the
environment will want to take into consideration the inevitable
effects that the TPP will have on climate change.
Another environmental concern of the implementation of
the TPP is the impact it could have on fishing. The United
States, Vietnam, Canada, and Chile are among the top fifteen
209
exporters of fish in the world.
Overfishing is an evergreenhouse-gases.html.
205. Misak Avetisyan et al., Trade and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
International Freight Transport 4 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
206. See, e.g., Rhys Jenkins, Has Trade Liberalization Created Pollution
Havens in Latin America?, 80 CEPAL REV. 81 (Aug., 2003); Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Domestic and International Environmental Impacts of
Agricultural Trade Liberalisation, COM/AGR/ENV(2000)75/FINAL (Vol. VIII,
n.90), (2000); Michael J. Ferrantino & Linda A. Linkins, The Effect of Global
Trade Liberalization on Toxic Emissions in Industry (Office of Econ. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 96-11-A, rev. 1998), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/research_working_papers/ec9611a
.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOBALISATION, TRANSPORT AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (Publication Brief, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org
/env/transportandenvironment/45095528.pdf.
207. Cristea et al., supra note 205, at 154.
208. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol
/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
209. Jeffrey J. Schott & Julia Muir, Environmental Issues in the TPP, in
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increasing concern as “one half of the global marine catch is
designated as fully exploited, one quarter as over exploited or
depleted, and the other quarter as underexploited but
210
composed mainly of low-value species.” This problem is not
strictly a conservational one, as “losses to the global economy
from the unsustainable exploitation of marine resources exceed
211
$50 billion annually.” While relaxed restrictions on fishing
contribute to overfishing, fishing subsidies, which are
estimated to total $16 billion worldwide each year, are a more
immediate concern as governments are actively promoting
212
overfishing. The TPP’s potential to curb such subsidies or
mitigate the potential for overfishing is another environmental
aspect that should not go unnoticed in negotiations between
member countries.
Wildlife conservation and illegal logging are additional
environmental concerns that could be addressed through the
TPP as member countries contain primary trading routes for
some of the world’s greatest concentrations of biological
213
diversity in animal and plant species. Illegal trade in wildlife
endangers species, destroys wildlife, and can cause the spread
of disease as well as the undesirable effects of organized
214
crime. Worldwide, illegal trade in wildlife generates between
ten to twenty billion dollars annually, and is especially
prevalent in TPP members countries such as Peru, Chile, and
215
those in Southeast Asia. Illegal logging is another problem in
216
TPP countries.
Illegal logging contributes to forest
degradation and accounts for five to ten percent of global
timber production, with annual losses of public assets in
217
developing countries estimated at roughly ten billion dollars.
The United States is one of the world’s largest timber product
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
TRADE AGREEMENT 187, 193 (C. L. Lim et al. eds., 2012).
210. Id. at 191 (citing WORLD BANK & FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE SUNKEN
BILLIONS: THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHERIES REFORM (2009)).
211. Id. at 193.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 194–95.
214. Id. at 194.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 195–96 (describing illegal logging as logging in protected areas
or areas of endangered species of trees, without the necessary permits).
217. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Arnoldo
Contreras-Hermosilla et al., The Economics of Illegal Logging and Associated
Trade, at 4, 17, OECD Doc. SG/SD/RT(2007)1/REV (Jan. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/39348796.pdf.
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consumers and top importers of tropical hardwoods, a
218
significant portion of which is illegally logged. Peru is one
source of illegally logged timber, while Malaysia and Vietnam
engage in smuggling and laundering of illegally logged timber
219
and products.
The TPP presents an opportunity to address worsening
220
environmental trends.
Climate change, overfishing, and
illegal logging have negative economic effects and could cause
even greater problems in the future if not dealt with as soon as
221
possible.
Environmental sustainability is extremely
important for the continuing prosperity and growth to which
222
the global economy is accustomed.
B.WHY INCLUDE ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS?
Inserting environment provisions into trade agreements is
not the only way countries implement environmental
agreements; however, it may be the most effective way of
enforcing them. It is estimated that “[w]orld leaders have
signed up to an impressive 500 internationally recognized
223
environmental agreements in the past 50 years . . . .” Today
there are over 250 multilateral environmental agreements in
224
effect. Environmental protection has become such a big issue
that it is now the second most common area of global rule225
making behind only trade. Despite the progress made over
the last couple of decades in actively promoting environmental
protection, there remains a lack of substantial change. Even
the promising “Rio+20,” a 2012 international conference on
sustainable development, attended by more than 130 heads of
state with government official from 192 countries, resulted in
only a forty-nine page nonbinding document which renewed
participants’ commitment to sustainable development and
218. Id.
219. Schott & Muir, supra note 209, at 196.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. John Vidal, Many Treaties to Save The Earth, But Where's the Will to
Implement Them?, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com
/environment/blog/2012/jun/07/earth-treaties-environmental-agreements.
224. The Doha Mandate on Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e
/envir_neg_mea_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
225. Vidal, supra note 223.
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promotion of an economically and environmentally sustainable
226
future. The conference was on par with previous efforts to
promote a sustainable environment but, as usual, resulted in
mostly hollow promises.
The problem with these environmental efforts is that
international law of any kind is inherently weak due to the
227
sovereignty
each
country
possesses.
International
environmental law runs into the tragedy of the commons
dilemma where countries acting independently and rationally
according to their own self-interest will pollute and deplete the
environment despite knowing that doing so is contrary to their
228
long-term best interests. Even if countries attempt to avoid
this dilemma through treaties or other agreements, free-riding
becomes an issue, as countries that decide not to join
environmental agreements still reap the benefits of those
229
agreements without paying the costs. Therefore, any agreed
upon environmental provisions are likely to be inadequate.
Furthermore, enforcement of these laws is an enormous
problem. The competing capitalist nature of nations encourages
the limited enforcement of any type of international law that
would negatively affect GDP. Because environmental law poses
a direct threat to short terms gains of countries, many nations
are unwilling to enforce it absent any incentives or enforcement
230
measures. If a country fails to adhere to environmental law,
there must be consequences in order for the law to have any
substantial impact. Yet, if the consequences are too harsh
countries will not engage in environmental agreements at all.
For example, the Kyoto Protocol was organized to create
binding obligations on industrialized countries to reduce their
GHG emissions. It was signed but never ratified by the United
231
States and was withdrawn from by Canada.
There were
226. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development RIO+20, Rio
de Janiero, Braz., June 20-22, 2012, The Future We Want, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.216/L.1.
227. See generally STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN
EXILE 50 (1998) (discussing the legal concept of sovereignty).
228. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing the tragedy of the commons).
229. See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS (1986) (discussing the free
rider problem).
230. See generally Schott & Muir, supra note 209 (discussing the links
between economies and environmental protection).
231. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 208.
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certain provisions in the Protocol with which the United States
232
Congress disagreed and to which they declined to adhere.
This is not the first time the United States has signed but
233
failed to ratify a treaty. There are currently ten treaties that
the United States has signed but not ratified that would
234
improve global environmental protection. With all the factors
working against strong and effective environmental
agreements, any opportunity for countries to enact effective
environmental laws should be taken. Therefore, it is imperative
that the TPP contain strong environmental provisions.
The international power of sovereign states renders it
exceptionally difficult for a government of intergovernmental
235
organization to impose its will upon a separate sovereign.
Trade sanctions are one of the few options at a country’s
236
disposal that directly affect another country. This is why the
current draft of the TPP contains at least twenty-six chapters,
many of which deal with diverse areas of trade such as
intellectual property rights, foreign investment, labor, and the
237
environment. These topics are covered because trade between
countries is more complex than just tariffs and quotas. The
laws that govern a country’s labor practices, copyrights,
patents, investment, and consumer and environmental
238
protection all affect the price of goods and services. Without
laws governing areas such as these, goods and services could be
239
provided at a much cheaper cost. At the local level, many
governments realize that the added cost is worth the benefits
240
and protection that these laws provide.
Internationally,
232. Paul Reynolds, Kyoto: Why Did the U.S. Pull Out?, BBC NEWS, Mar.
30, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1248757.stm; U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 208.
233. MARY JANE ANGELO ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
RECLAIMING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP: WHY THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD RATIFY TEN PENDING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES 2–4 (White Paper
No. 1201, Jan. 2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org
/articles/International_Environmental_Treaties_1201.pdf.
234. Id.
235. See generally TALMON, supra note 227.
236. See, e.g., Milica Delevic, Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool:
The Cases of Yugoslavia, 3 INT’L J. OF PEACE STUD. 1 (1998).
237. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).
238. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY (Addison-Wesley 2009) (1988).
239. Id.
240. Id.
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however, it is much harder to get countries to agree to
international standards because of the increasingly competitive
241
and diverse nature of the globalized world. Connecting these
areas of law to trade agreements, therefore, is the only true
way to make them effective in order to provide real
consequences for those who do not adhere to an agreement
while still creating incentives for countries to join the
agreement. FTAs need to internalize the costs that free trade
has on the environment in order to promote both an
242
environmentally and economically sustainable future.
C.ENVIRONMENTAL
FUTURE

PROVISIONS

FOR

A

SUSTAINABLE

The first step towards ensuring that the TPP adequately
promotes environmental interests is eliminating the secrecy of
the document and negotiations. Negotiation drafts of the TPP
should be made available to Congress and the public. In June
2012, four senators sent a letter to the Obama administration
asking for greater congressional access to negotiations on the
243
TPP. In August, Representative Walter Jones introduced a
resolution in the House of Representatives that would require
244
Congress to be allowed to observe TPP negotiations. Then, in
October, ten senators said that a strong environment chapter in
245
the TPP would be critical to their support. It is apparent that
there is a growing concern in Congress over the secrecy of the
TPP. Congress has the ultimate say in whether the United
States accepts the finalized version of the TPP. If more
members of Congress continue to demand strong environment
241. Id.
242. See generally David P. Vincent, Internalizing Externalities: An
Economic and Legal Analysis of an International Carbon Tax Regime, 92 OR.
L. REV. 163, 164 (2013) (addressing the costs of environmental externalities
and the possibilities present within the current international trade regime for
enhancing economic welfare by liberalizing world trade and mitigating climate
change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
243. Zach Carter, Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks: Senators Demand
Access to Controversial Documents After Leak, HUFFINGTON POST, June 25,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/25/trans-pacific-partnershipdocuments-sherrod-brown-jeff-merkley-ron-wyden-robertmenendez_n_1624956.html.
th
244. H.R. Res. 767, 112 Cong. (2012).
245. Ilana Solomon, Senators Agree: Trade Must Protect the Environment,
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ilanasolomon/trans-pacific-partnership-_b_1982368.html.

VINCENT Article

2014]

2/27/2014 5:59 PM

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

37

provisions and require transparency in the negotiations in
order for the TPP to receive their support, they will force the
Obama administration to take them seriously or risk wasting
years on an FTA that has no chance of passing.
Another improvement that should be made in the TPP
concerns the dispute resolution system. The arbitration model
used in NAFTA and CAFTA-DR needs to be changed because it
is not living up to its goal of creating a unity of expectations for
246
the parties involved in Chapter 11 disputes. The current
system’s use of a non-consistent group of arbitrators does not
adequately protect environmental interests; it lacks consistency
and accountability, which makes it difficult for parties to know
what the law is or what to expect if certain claims are resolved
through arbitration. While CAFTA-DR’s additional language on
expropriation was beneficial in correcting NAFTA’s mistakes,
there is no guarantee that arbitrators will interpret other parts
of the TPP in ways the drafters intended. Establishing a
permanent international court system, resembling current
American courts, to oversee TPP environmental disputes could
be one solution. Ideally, one judge with a background in
environmental law could be appointed from each member
nation. A five-judge panel would hear disputes that arise,
making sure to exclude any judges appointed from a member
nation in the dispute. Such a system would provide much
greater consistency. There would be a regular group of judges
who have experience in the type of law they are ruling on. They
would be held more accountable for inconsistent decisions,
giving decisions a greater precedential effect.
The TPP also needs to include concrete standards on
environmental sustainability that member countries must
achieve. The initial plan of the United States to incorporate the
same environmental standards for all TPP members is not fair
247
or rational, based on varying degrees of development.
Provisions such as emission standards and polluting
regulations that are tailored to the size and development of
member countries would be a fairer approach and more likely
to receive approval. Standards that gradually change over
many years would be the most effective approach, as countries
246. Jack Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year:
An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1453 (2003).
247. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).
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would have the opportunity to improve their environmental
impact. Considering the amount of environmental treaties
currently in effect, the TPP should adopt many of the
environmental standards from popular treaties but add the
enforcement mechanism that current treaties lack. The Kyoto
Protocol was a good starting point to raise awareness of climate
change, but it failed to address a number of core issues, such as
“setting targets based on a fair and efficient burden-sharing
principle, effectively engaging developing countries, setting a
long-term goal, implementing cost-effective policy instruments
with
given
binding
target,
[and]
non-compliance
248
penalties . . .”
Under the TPP, developed countries could
adopt standards on GHGs that require members to decrease
emissions each year. The largest emitters would be required to
decrease their emissions the most and prevent their emissions
from increasing by more than five percent a year until they
reached a designated level of emissions under which they
would be required to remain. Those that violate the standards
would be taxed on the amount of emissions that exceeded their
limit and would fund programs designed to promote greener
production.
Another provision the TPP could adopt is from the recent
APEC agreement to cut tariffs on fifty-four categories of goods
249
that are seen as environmentally friendly. The agreement
was seen as an environmental achievement but hardly a
250
breakthrough because of its unenforceability. By integrating
such provisions, the TPP would promote environmental
progress while giving earlier agreements an enforcement
mechanism not previously attainable. This agreement would
likely be effective, because it would be easy to implement and
monitor and would increase the export and use of
environmentally friendly goods.
The TPP could even look to implement a system of carbon
251
taxes or border adjustments.
Ideally, border adjustments
248. Jing Cao, Reconciling Human Development and Climate Protection:
Perspectives from Developing Countries on Post-2012 International Climate
Change Policy 1 (Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements, Discussion
Paper 2008-25, 2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu
/files/CaoWeb2.pdf.
249. Partners and Rivals: Another Ambitious Trade Agreement Gets Bogged
Down, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com
/node/21563292.
250. Id.
251. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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would apply to both imports and exports entering into
international trade, enabling nations to offset the economic
burdens associated with carbon taxes when trading countries
252
vary in their tax regimes. Nations could tax imports from
253
non-carbon-taxing countries based on their carbon content.
This would enable countries to “rectify domestic price
differentials by taxing imported products at the same level as
254
those produced domestically.” For exports, nations could offer
rebates for carbon taxes paid by taxed producers for goods
255
exported to other countries with carbon taxes.
Countries
would be able to refund the carbon taxes paid by their domestic
producers for exported goods in order to prevent the double
taxation of domestic producers by both the domestic state as
256
well as the importing state.
Although carbon taxes coupled with border adjustments
present a viable solution for reducing emissions, the unilateral
adoption of such a regime “may well raise complex questions
with respect to the WTO consistency and the conditions under
which border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of
257
international competitiveness.” These questions arise because
(OECD) Working Party in 1970 defined border tax adjustments as “[A]ny fiscal
measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle
(i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax
charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold
to consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to
consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing
country in respect of similar domestic products).” World Trade Organization,
Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 4, L/3464 (Nov. 20,
1970),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF
/90840088.pdf.
252. Id. ¶ 5.
253. Daniel McNamee, Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the World
Trade Organization: Challenges and Conflicts, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y
41, 41–42 (2006).
254. Id. at 42.
255. Joshua Elliott et al., Trade and Carbon Taxes, 100 AM. ECON. REV.
465, 465 (2010), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~kortum/papers
/AERpp_final.pdf.
256. Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax
Cooperation on Climate Change, 13–15, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2010/CRP.12 (Oct.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/sixthsession
/CRP12_Draft.pdf.
257. Timothy E. Deal, U.S. Council for Int’l Bus., WTO Rules and
Procedures and Their Implication for the Kyoto Protocol 2 (Discussion Paper,
2008), available at http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf (quoting
ZhongXiang Zhand & Lucas Assunção, Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO
3 (East-West Ctr., East-West Ctr. Working Papers, Envt. Ser. No. 51, 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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such a tax regime may be considered a barrier to trade, and
therefore present a potential conflict with the rules of the
258
WTO. However, recent legal research suggests that such a
259
system would comport with international law.
The TPP should also encourage growth in green technology
in order to promote strong investment in that sector. Currently,
there is a WTO dispute regarding what particular types of
green subsidies are permissible, something the TPP could
clarify in order to foster more development of green
260
technology.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to
environmental protection to limit subsidies on environmental
goods, it is essential in order to promote long-term benefits.
When countries are allowed to boost exports through green
subsidies, foreign investment in green technology is negatively
261
impacted due to artificially low cost alternatives. Long-term
viability in industries, such as clean energy, rests on the ability
to provide energy at an equal or lower cost than fossil fuels
262
while maintaining equal or better performance. Subsidizing
exports may promote the deployment of green technology in the
short-term, but it reduces the incentive for countries to invest
in the improvement of green technology, which is essential to
progressing to a point where clean energy is less costly than the
263
available alternative.
Of course these proposals will not have the desired effect
without enforcement mechanisms tied into the TPP, but the
potential agreement represents a great opportunity to hold
countries to their commitments. The United States has a
considerable advantage in trade negotiations because it
represents the largest economy not only at the table, but in the
world. Reducing barriers to trade with the United States and
258. All WTO members must undergo periodic scrutiny of their trade
policies and practices to ensure they do not impose an unfair barrier to trade.
See Annual Report 2010, WORLD TRADE ORG. 2, http://www.wto.org
/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep10_e.pdf.
259. Valentina Durán Medina & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, A Legal View on
Border Tax Adjustments and Climate Change: A Latin American Perspective,
11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 29, 31–32 (2011).
260. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development RIO+20,
supra note 226, at 47–48.
261. Matthew Stepp & Robert D. Atkinson, Green Mercantilism: The
Threat to the Clean Energy Economy, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATIVE FOUND.
(June 14, 2012), http://www.itif.org/publications/green-mercantilism-threatclean-energy-economy.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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other large countries could provide enormous benefits for
developing nations, but giving up the ability to use tariffs and
quotas without guarantees of stronger environmental
protection measures would be foolish. The benefits of free trade
are obvious, which is likely why so many countries are onboard
with the TPP. If adopted, it would be the largest multilateral
FTA in the world, and additional countries like Japan and
264
Thailand are still considering joining.
As more countries join the TPP, countries that are left out
will feel increasing pressure to join or lose out on the benefits
265
that competing TPP member nations gain. Thus, requiring
countries to adhere to certain environmental standards before
obtaining membership in the TPP may create incentives for
nations outside the agreement to improve environmental
standards in hopes of gaining acceptance. The European Union
(E.U.), while much more than a trade agreement, has a similar
trade and economic structure though its amalgamation of
266
numerous national governments and economies. Much like
E.U. economic standards for membership, TPP members could
consider a country’s environmental resume before agreeing to
admit that country. TPP nations must already agree to promote
267
sound environmental policies.
Potential members’ current
environment policies, environmental improvements over the
past several years, and likelihood of continual improvement
could all be factors considered before acceptance into the TPP.
There could also be temporary membership for the first several
years to ensure that countries abide by the environmental
standards before giving them permanent membership.
Once members are permanent, one of the more important
enforcement mechanisms that should be integrated into the
TPP are trade sanctions. While the effectiveness of trade
264. TPP Talks Go Slowly, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 30, 2013,
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/367226/tpp-talks-go-slowly.
265. See MIREYA SOLIS, SOUTH KOREA’S FATEFUL DECISION ON THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Paper No. 31, Sept.,
2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers
/2013/09/0918%20south%20korea%20trans%20pacific%20partnership%20solis
/0918%20south%20korea%20trans%20pacific%20partnership%20solis.pdf
(explaining how the size and openness of the TPP is making it increasingly
necessary for South Korea to join).
266. EU Enlargement: The Next Seven, BBC NEWS, (July 1, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616.
267. Nadia Gire, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Revival in
United States Trade Policy Reform, 20 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 60, 67
(2012).
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sanctions is often debated, economic studies have shown “that a
punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade
268
policies are endogenous.” The use of trade sanctions would
not create the perfect balance between free markets and
269
environmental protection but could be very effective. Unless
the world can come together and implement global
environmental taxes, there is little hope for incentivizing a
significant level of environmental protection apart from trade
270
sanctions. Trade and competition are significant causes of
environmental problems, and the solution to those problems
must be connected to the source.
271
However, trade sanctions and other forms of ‘hard law’
are not favored by those who believe the “soft law approach” is
272
more suitable for environmentally sustainable development.
The first problem presented by trade sanctions is the
supranational enforcement agency that could be created to
investigate and impose the sanctions, analogous to NAFTA’s
CEC, except with greater authority. An outside force secondguessing decisions of local and federal governments presents a
unique and daunting challenge. It would also require a large
bureaucracy to implement an independent multinational
secretariat, which could possibly conflict with the constitutions
of its member nations. While these are obvious legitimate
concerns, the soft law approach alone is just too ineffective and
“soft” to currently combat the increasingly dire environmental

268. Alireza Naghavi, Trade Sanctions and Green Trade Liberalization, 15
ENV’T AND DEV. ECON. 379, 379 (2010).
269. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to
Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131 (1995).
270. See id. at 2151 (explaining why multilateral cooperation on
environmental protection is difficult to achieve).
271. Arguably the term ‘hard law’ is redundant, but the phrase is useful to
distinguish these policies from ‘soft law’. See Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of
Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 168 (1996); see also Wolfgang Reinicke &
Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization, and Sovereignty: The Role
of Non-binding International Legal Accords, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE 75, 76 n.3 (Dina Shelton ed., 2000) (“‘[S]oft’ law as used herein
means normative agreements that are not legally binding.”).
272. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., NAFTA AND FREE TRADE IN
THE AMERICAS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 763–65 (2d ed. 2005)
(citing Richard A. Johnson, Commentary, Trade Sanctions and Environmental
Objectives in the NAFTA, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 577 (1993)); Susan
Emmenegger & Alex Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights Seriously: The
Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
545 (1993).
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273

picture. Ideally, trade sanctions would be rarely used and
would mainly function as a deterrent. If they are to be used,
however, it should be only when there is a clear violation of an
environmental provision. A small increase on tariffs for the
offender’s non-environmental goods would be an adequate
sanction.
It is important to ensure that sanctions are not too harsh
or else they risk significantly stifling trade to the point where
members no longer receive the expected economic benefits of
274
the TPP.
Implementing defined environmental standards
with trade sanctions and/or significant monetary penalties for
violators combined with the soft law approach taken by NAFTA
and CAFTA-DR would be a substantial improvement over any
current international environmental law system. The soft law
approach should not be completely abandoned as organizations
that research and propose new and effective ways to create
environmental sustainability are important and should be
275
given the proper funding and support to fulfill their goals.
The soft law approach, combined with these potential
provisions to the TPP would finally internalize the costs of
trade and production, and incentivize its members to promote
environmental sustainability in the present day.
CONCLUSION
FTAs remain an important part of global economic policy.
As countries search for ways to economically grow, it is
essential for them to realize the current path is not an
economically sustainable one due to the present and future
challenges that climate change and other environmental
problems present. FTAs represent both a possible threat and
solution to environmental sustainability, and may be the
difference in whether the global community is able to prevent
the predicted death of millions of people and trillions of dollars
in lost prosperity due environmental problems.
Although environmentalists greatly opposed both NAFTA

273. See Chang, supra note 269 at 2150–60.
274. Id. at 2162 (observing that overly harsh sanctions could cause
countries to abandon activities where the economic benefit outweighs the
environmental harm, decreasing growth).
275. See Mumme, supra note 68 (explaining the beneficial effects of the
CEC in NAFTA).
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and CAFTA-DR,
the measurable environmental effects of
those trade agreements have not been as dire as previously
predicted. Even the missteps of investor-state cases of NAFTA
were corrected in CAFTA-DR and so far have been limited in
scope. Extrapolating from that, there is not a large likelihood of
investor-state cases in the TPP causing significant
environmental effects, although the dispute resolution system
can be improved from those of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR to
provide more transparency and certainty. Even though the
environmental impact of past FTAs has not been
overwhelmingly negative, the TPP could go a long way towards
actively protecting the environment in ways NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR failed to do. There are several important
environmental issues involving TPP members such as GHG
emissions, overfishing, and illegal logging. The TPP could be a
significant force in limiting these environmental problems.
Outside of large economic agreements such as the TPP,
there is little hope for effective international environmental
law, putting more pressure on the negotiators of the TPP to
succeed in including effective environmental provisions.
Although world leaders have signed over 500 international
environmental agreements in the last fifty years, there has
277
been little progress toward environmental goals. In 2012 the
Global Environmental Outlook researched the ninety most
important environmental issues and found that significant
278
progress had only been made in four.
Environmental
agreements are negatively impacted by the increasing amount
of FTAs, lack of ratification or participation of important
countries, and even the over-congestion of environmental
agreements themselves. In the UN alone, thirty-five separate
279
organizations influence global environmental governance.
This creates conflicting agendas and inconsistent rules and
norms, which greatly impair the organizations’ abilities to
280
complete their goals. Lack of enforcement remains the largest
276. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), PUBLICCITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=531 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013)
(mentioning that environmental groups opposed NAFTA).
277. Richard Black, Green Decline ‘May Bring Irreversible Change’, BBC
NEWS (June 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment18339905; Vidal, supra note 223 (mentioning the 500-plus agreements signed
in the last 50 years).
278. Id.
279. Vidal, supra note 223.
280. Id.
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issue as countries are unwilling to give up their sovereignty or
economic advantages. Countries largely remain short-sighted
on the environment. This lack of incentive to protect the
environment on a global scale, combined with the tragedy of
the commons issue and free-riding dilemmas, makes all current
international environmental agreements insufficient.
For these reasons, the TPP and similar trade agreements
represent the best chance for true promotion of environmental
sustainability. Because the economic benefits of the TPP
increase with each new member, the agreement provides the
leverage needed to compel its members and potential members
to enforce their environmental agreements and create stronger
ones. The TPP has the opportunity to set the standard for
environmental sustainability by requiring potential members
to improve their environmental policies in order to join. Actual
members would also be held to high standards that require
gradual improvement and are based on that country’s level of
economic development.
Trade sanctions, taxes, and monetary penalties would
provide the enforcement mechanisms, which, when combined
with the current soft law approach of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR,
could create the first truly effective body of international
environmental law. This would allow the TPP to include many
environmental standards from other popular treaties that have
previously been ineffective due to lack of enforcement. The goal
of the environmental provisions is not to prohibit trade but to
internalize the negative costs of trade and industrialization.
Countries may lose some economic gains in the short term, but
by doing so, they will prevent massive losses in the long term.
Unfortunately for the environment and our future, strong
environmental provisions that include real enforcement
measures are not likely to be included in the TPP. The TPP is
an expansive document and environmental concerns are not a
high priority for many negotiating countries that want to focus
on strengthening their economies. The United States and other
countries’ main priority may be to marginalize China’s
influence in the area, and therefore, they may be willing to
exclude strong environmental provisions in order to reach an
agreement. Additionally, the sheer number of countries
involved makes detailed environmental provisions and
standards hard to manage, and the public has had little say or
influence over the document due to its secrecy in negotiations.
Most of the additions to the TPP proposed in this comment
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are not being considered in TPP negotiations and represent
significant changes to past free trade agreements. If public was
more aware of the TPP, perhaps proposed provisions such as
these could gain more traction, but as it stands the TPP has not
received the level of press that should be associated with such
an important document. While the TPP may not pose a large
threat to the environment, it is also unlikely to be the
environmental savior that is severely needed. For the sake of
present and future generations, we must hope that world
leaders implement robust environmental protections before it is
too late.

